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Much of cognitive neuropsychology is
underpinned by the empirical documentation of
dissociations and double dissociations that are used
to fractionate cognition into domain-specific
processes. Category-specific disorders (CSDs) are
perhaps one of the archetypal examples of domain-
specificity – being typically defined by the
presence of dissociations between living and
nonliving naming ability. The methods adopted to
quantify naming across categories are therefore
pivotal since they provide the criterion for defining
whether patients have a CSD and necessarily
influence both the direction and the interpretation
of further testing. 
A search of bibliographic databases and recent
reviews reveals that by far the most common
strategy for documenting CSDs has been to use a
within-patient comparison of living and nonliving
naming (Table I). Two-thirds (22/33) of case
studies have used a within-subject comparison
(with χ2 analysis) to establish category naming
effects; with only approximately 1 in 5 studies
including any controls for comparison purposes. It
will be argued that the pervasive use of a within-
subject approach is likely to mislead about both the
presence and the direction of CSDs. Moreover, the
empirical status of the dissociations and double
dissociations in this literature therefore require
closer examination, especially with regard to
methodological requirements for defining a
category-specific naming deficit (be it living or
nonliving).
THE ASSUMPTION OF NORMALITY
Why would the majority of category-specific
studies fail to include control data? This may partly
reflect the assumption that patient performance
would be an exaggeration of the normal profile.
Most commonly, this assumption suggests that
normal subjects would find living things more
difficult to name than nonliving things because the
former are, for example less familiar, have lower
name frequencies, or have greater visual complexity
(Stewart et al., 1992; Funnell and Sheridan, 1992).
Nevertheless, as with patient studies, it is necessary
to examine the performance of controls on sets of
living and nonliving stimuli that are not confounded
by these and other potential artefactual variables. In
contrast to expectation, recent studies using matched
sets of stimuli have reported better and faster
naming of living than nonliving things in
neurologically intact subjects (Laws, 1999, 2000,
2001a, 2001b; Laws and Gale, 2002; Laws and
Neve, 1999). We cannot, therefore, simply assume
what is normal – this must be explicitly examined
anew in each case1. 
Moreover, such ‘artefactual explanations’ can
only ever account for half of the phenomenon e.g.
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ABSTRACT
Category-specific disorders are perhaps the archetypal example of domain-specificity – being typically defined by the
presence of dissociations between living and nonliving naming ability in people following neurological damage. The
methods adopted to quantify naming across categories are therefore pivotal since they provide the criterion for defining
whether patients have a category effect and necessarily influence the subsequent direction and the interpretation of testing.
This paper highlights a series of methodological concerns relating to how we measure and define category (or any)
dissociations. These include the common failure to include control data or the use of control data that is inappropriate e.g.
at ceiling, unmatched. A review of past cases shows that the overwhelming majority suffers from these problems and
therefore challenges conclusions about the purported empirical demonstrations of dissociations and double dissociations in
the category specific literature. This is not a refutation of category deficits, but skepticism about the current existence of
any convincing empirical demonstrations of category specific double dissociations. As a potential solution, certain minimal
criteria are proposed that might aid with the attempt to document category effects that are more methodologically
convincing.
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1 Patients and controls should also be gender-matched. Recent studies have
consistently reported better naming of nonliving things by males and better
naming of living things by females in Alzheimer patients (Laiacona et al.
1998), aphasics (Laiacona et al., 2003), as well as normal controls (Laws,
1999, 2000, 2004) and this even extends to semantic fluency (Laws et al.,
2005).
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the above-named variables cannot explain
nonliving disorders. It is also conceivable that
different variables act as naming moderators for
normal subjects and patients and even perhaps at
differing degrees of impairment (for a discussion
see Laws et al., 2002)2.
PROBLEMS OF WITHIN-PATIENT ANALYSIS
What are the consequences of failing to evaluate
naming in normal controls? Consider the
hypothetical examples outlined in Figure 1. In each
case, the absolute difference reveals a quite different
dissociation from that disclosed when a control
comparison is included. Patient 1 shows no absolute
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difference, but when referenced to control data,
exhibits a dissociation (false negative). Patient 2
appears to have a dissociation, but this disappears
when referenced to controls (false positive); and
finally, patient 3 seems to have a dissociation in one
direction, but when referenced to controls actually
has the opposite pattern of dissociation (paradoxical
dissociation). Indeed, Laws et al. (2005) compared
the impact of using and not using controls in
category naming tasks with Alzheimer’s patients and
found individual cases with patterns of performance
that corresponded to most of the hypothetical
examples in Figure 1. Additionally, Laws et al.
(2005) found that the commonly used within-patient
analysis (using χ2) produced far fewer significant
deficits than between-group comparisons, pointing to
a potential variant of the file-drawer problem in this
literature. Hence, the absolute living-nonliving
naming difference alone (be it exceptionally large or
even non-existent) provides a misleading indicator of
both the presence and the direction of category
effects.
Spurious dissociations would, of course,
contribute to spurious double dissociations. Indeed,
Fig. 1 – Hypothetical examples showing how a lack of control data could distort the interpretation of category effects.
Example 1: Patient 1 appears to show no category effect, but referencing to control data reveals a living deficit
Example 2: Patient 2 appears to have a nonliving deficit, but this disappears when referenced to controls
Example 3: Patient 3 appears to have a category deficit for nonliving, but referencing to control data reveals a living
deficit
2 Although patient studies now routinely address the differences in such
variables via various techniques (matching, regression etc), this is an
“eternal null hypothesis”. Additionally, we might consider how much
matching is required and how this might affect the stimulus choice in the
two categories? For example, a recent study matched stimuli on 17 such
variables (Kolinsky et al., 2002). This must have consequences for the
validity and representability of categories (especially for nonliving things
because they are usually chosen to match the familiarity, visual complexity
and so on for living things).
they raise the possibility of bizarre inverse double
dissociations: for example, a patient appearing to
have a nonliving deficit (that is actually living) and
another patient showing an apparent living deficit
(who actually has a nonliving deficit). By contrast,
others (like patient 1) would be ignored because of
the lack of an absolute living-nonliving difference
despite the fact that their performance is
abnormal3. 
A METHOD TO EMPIRICALLY DEMONSTRATE
DISSOCIATIONS
The interpretation of double dissociations has
generated substantial debate (see forum in Cortex 39;
Crawford et al., 2003); however, issues relating to the
empirical demonstration of dissociations (and thereby
double dissociations) have received far less attention.
As outlined above, the widely-used within-patient χ2
analysis is misleading and so, it is important to
consider what might be a more appropriate method
for documenting category dissociations.
Even where normal data are available, some
analyses (e.g., z-scores with small normative
samples) will overestimate the degree of
impairment and inflate the Type I error rate (see
Laws et al., 2005). This is because the statistics of
the control sample are treated as population
parameters rather than sample statistics.
Additionally, it is possible for patients to be
impaired at naming living or nonliving things, but
that the difference between their scores fails to
reach significance; conversely, a patient may be
severely impaired on both tasks, but still show
differential impairment. Therefore, for those
patients showing impaired naming of living and/or
nonliving things, it is also necessary to examine
the living-nonliving discrepancy score by
comparing this with the mean discrepancy score in
a normative sample.
Fortunately, methods have recently been
developed to overcome these difficulties and are
outlined in detail elsewhere (see Crawford and
Garthwaite, 2002; Crawford et al., 2003; Laws et
al., 2005). Moreover, Crawford et al. (2003) have
recently provided fully specified criteria for
Shallice’s (1988) classification of “strong” and
“classical” dissociations (for examples see Laws et
846 Keith R. Laws
al., 2005; Laws and Sartori, 2005)4. A patient is
considered to exhibit a strong dissociation if they
were impaired at naming both living and nonliving
and show a significant difference between the two
scores. A patient would be considered to exhibit a
classical dissociation if they are impaired at only
living or nonliving naming and showed a
significant difference between the impaired and
intact category.
CONTROL DATA IN THE CATEGORY SPECIFIC
LITERATURE
What about when control data have been presented
and analysed? One area of the category-specific
literature where controls have more commonly been
tested is that involving Alzheimer’s patients. A review
of category specific studies with Alzheimer patients,
however, shows that most have controls who perform
at ceiling (see Laws et al., 2005).
Ceiling effects in controls do, of course, distort
analyses involving comparison with patients.
Explicitly examining this, Laws et al. (2005)
compared a series of DAT patients and matched
controls on two stimulus sets: the typical Snodgrass
and Vanderwart (1980) stimuli (Table I shows that
the majority of studies have relied on this corpus)
that produced ceiling effects in controls and
another set that produced equivalent below-ceiling
levels of naming for living and nonliving things.
Laws et al. found that the presence of ceiling
effects exaggerated the number of living deficits
and underestimated the number of nonliving
deficits. Moreover, paradoxical category effects
occurred across different stimulus sets for the same
patients i.e. living and nonliving deficits on
different sets both for group and even individual
patient analyses (Laws et al., 2003, 2005; see also
Laws and Sartori, 2005).
What about the case studies that used controls?
Of 33 case studies, only seven (21%) analysed
patient naming data using control performance 
(six others had normal controls, but they were not
used in any inferential analysis: see Table II). In
three studies (with the vast majority of controls),
the patients and controls were not matched 
for example on age, gender or background 
(e.g. Turnbull and Laws, 2000; Caramazza and
Shelton, 1998; Laiacona et al., 1997). One study
had control data, but did not present these data
(DeRenzi and Lucchelli, 1994). Another did test
naming, but controls performed at ceiling and were
not used in the comparison (Kolinsky et al., 2002).
3 Consider patient SE (Laws et al., 1995) was initially overlooked because
of his comparable living and nonliving naming; however, further
investigation revealed an underlying associative semantics deficit for
animals. This raises an important issue about the common use of naming to
define category effects. In fact, it is difficult to conceive of any a priori
finding for determining a category disorder e.g. a category difference for:
picture naming, attribute verification, naming to definition, fluency,
drawing or any combination of these. It raises a critical tension between
empirically and theoretically driven category effects. For example, we
could decide arbitrarily that, for a category effect to be convincing, a
patient must exhibit the same effect on three tests, A (picture naming), B
(drawing) and C (attribute verification); however, another patient impaired
on A and B and not C may tell us something about the true nature of
category effects e.g. that they might be related to visual input (see Laws
and Sartori, in press).
4 Shallice (1988) originally proposed three main types of dissociation:
trend, strong and classical and all are assumed to be documented with
respect to control data. The trend dissociation is the weakest since it
documents only a nonsignificant trend in the direction of dissociation (and
the patient is impaired on both tasks); strong reflects a significant
difference across the two tasks (but the patient is impaired on both); and
classical where, compared to controls, the patient is impaired on one task
and normal on the second task.
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One study (Moss et al., 1997) produced naming
data that were contradicted by an earlier study 
of the same patient (Laws et al., 1995). This 
leaves one study that had 10 matched controls
(Pietrini et al., 1988) but critically, control naming
was at ceiling. So, not one single case study,
examining category effects in patients, compares
patient performance with data from matched
controls on matched stimuli (with performance
below ceiling).
DOUBLE DISSOCIATIONS IN THE CATEGORY SPECIFIC
NAMING LITERATURE
What are the implications for documenting
dissociations and double dissociations in the
category-specific literature? Given that a minority
of category specific studies (7/33) have used
control data, most reported dissociations would not
fulfil the requirements for the weakest dissociation
i.e. trend dissociation (which Shallice rejects as
being insufficient to infer cognitive architecture
whether it documents a putative double
dissociation or not). Of those that do include
controls, what might they tell us about category-
specific dissociations and double dissociations?
One notable feature that emerges from
reviewing category-specific studies concerns the
manner in which double dissociations are
empirically demonstrated. Rather than being double
dissociations, they are in fact complimentary
dissociations. As Shallice (1988) points out, it is
often assumed that a double dissociation occurs
“…when patient A performs task I significantly
better than task II, but for patient B the situation is
reversed”, but that it is, however, “theoretically
unsound to operationalise a double dissociation
merely as two complimentary dissociations in two
patients, as its dangerously misleading name
suggests” (p. 234). Rather “…the valid formulation
of double dissociation …is that on task I, patient A
performs significantly better than patient B, but on
task II, the situation is reversed” (p. 235). Indeed,
purported double dissociations in the category-
specific literature invariably reflect complimentary
dissociations. In other words, most studies
document that: patient A performs task I
significantly better than task II, and contrast 
this with patient B for whom the situation appears
to be reversed. This may be an unavoidable
difficulty; Crawford et al. (2003) note that they are
unaware of any inferential statistical method that
would allow us to test whether patient A is
significantly more impaired than patient B and
vice-versa.
Fortunately, a reliance on complimentary
dissociations is not as problematic as it may appear
since, as Shallice (1998) concedes, the conditions in
which such dissociations stem from resource
artefacts are unlikely to occur with real data. In the
category specificity literature, however, many of the
putative dissociations do not even qualify strictly as
complimentary dissociations. Instead they often take
the following form: patient A achieves a significantly
larger absolute score on test I than on test II; and
patient B achieves a significantly larger absolute
score on test IIa than on test Ia. In this case, tests I
and Ia (II and IIa) are not the same, but assumed to
be ostensibly similar tests. Nevertheless, tests I and
Ia would invariably differ in many ways that could
strongly influence performance, including
differences in: presentation conditions; the stimuli
themselves; the numbers of stimuli; the stimulus
characteristics (e.g., familiarity, name frequency,
visual complexity etc); resource demands; they may
or may not be matched; they may contain different
subcategories across different studies (e.g. animals
may include or exclude sea creatures, insects, birds;
living things generally may or may not include fruits
and vegetables etc); and some may not include body
parts or musical instruments (and some may consider
them to be either living or nonliving)5. Hence, almost
all attempts to demonstrate double dissociations in
this literature are neither expressed on nor
comparable on the same scale.
A SINGLE DOUBLE DISSOCIATION IS ALL THAT’S
REQUIRED?
Despite the reservations outlined above, a single
convincing double dissociation might suffice to
demonstrate the fractionation of living and nonliving
naming. It might also be argued that a double
dissociation is only as good as the evidence for the
less well-documented of the two dissociations. Since
nonliving cases are in a minority (of 5:1), it could be
argued that category-specific double dissociations
are only as convincing as the evidence for the
nonliving cases.
A search of the literature reveals 6 cases that
present naming data from nonliving cases (see Table
III)6. Of the six studies, three have controls but in
two, the patient data were not referenced to the
control data (which are at ceiling in any case: Cappa
et al., 1998; Laiacona and Capitani, 2001). In the
remaining study with controls (Turnbull and Laws,
2000) the data were unusual in being derived from
the same stimuli but using a different paradigm
(rapid presentation) and so control performance was
below ceiling, but it comes from undergraduates
5 It is notable that different studies deal with musical instruments and body
parts in an ad hoc fashion. For example, see Table 3 where both are
presented as nonliving things by Sacchett and Humphreys (1992); MI as
nonliving and BP as living by Silveri et al. (1997); or include BP and not
MI (Hillis and Caramazza, 1991); while others do not include either
(Laiacona or Capitani, 2001).
6 Some studies have documented nonliving disorders in aphasics, who are
tested on word-picture matching and category sorting tasks (e.g. Warrington
and McCarthy, 1987; Behrmann and Lieberthal, 1989). In these cases, any
double dissociation would be documented with very different testing
procedures i.e. poorer matching of nonliving versus poorer naming of
living.
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(patient SM was over 80 years old) and ultimately
was used for comparison rather than analysis.
Of the remaining three studies without controls,
each has problems aside from not having controls. If
we turn to the study by Hillis and Caramazza (1991)
in more detail because this paper claimed to present
a double dissociation across two patients (JJ and
PS)7. Unlike other putative double dissociations, this
study does test the two patients on the same
materials8. Hillis and Caramazza (1991) argue that
the profiles reflect a disproportionate impairment of
animals in PS (or a relative sparing of non-animals)
and a relative sparing of animals in JJ (an
impairment of non-animals). While this study comes
closest to fulfilling the requirements for
documenting a double dissociation (albeit between
animals and non-animals), the failure to reference
the patient profiles to control data makes it
impossible to provide an unambiguous interpretation
of the patient data. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This paper highlights several previously ignored
methodological issues concerning how we measure
and define dissociations. In particular, it raises
doubts about whether published category-specific
cases have documented the deficits that are claimed
because of their failure to include control data or
using control data that is inappropriate, e.g,. at
ceiling, unmatched. In this context, a review of
past cases shows that many suffer from these
problems; and therefore challenges conclusions
about the purported empirical demonstrations of
dissociations and double dissociations. This is not a
denial of the existence of CSDs, but skepticism
about the existence of any currently convincing
empirical demonstrations of category specific
double dissociations.
In addition to previously outlined criteria for
examining category effects (e.g. matching of
stimuli across category), researchers might also
wish to consider whether their data meet – what
appear to be – important minimal criteria required
for the empirical documentation of a category-
specific dissociation9. These criteria would include:
that the analysis compares the patient with normal
controls (who are adequately matched); that the
controls perform below ceiling on the task; and
finally, that the analysis involves a comparison of
the (standardized) living-nonliving difference score
against the distribution of difference scores
obtained in the controls.
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